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Abstract
In ordinary computer programmes, the relationship between data in a machine and
the concepts it represents is dened arbitrarily by the programmer. It is argued here
that the Strong AI hypothesis suggests that no such arbitrariness is possible in the
relationship between brain states and mental experiences, and that this may place
surprising limitations on the possible variety of mental experiences.
Possible psychology experiments are sketched which aim to falsify the Strong AI hy-
pothesis by indicating that these limits can be exceeded. It is concluded that although
such experiments might be valuable, they are unlikely to succeed in this aim.
1 The argument in brief
The Strong AI hypothesis [2], is that a mind is associated with any suitably sophisticated
machine
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. Given this, it seems reasonable to presume furthermore that any specic mental
experience is associated with (or `produced by') one or more specic machine states or state
trajectories. The number of distinct possible mental experiences must therefore be limited
by the number of possible machine state trajectories.
The set of possible machine state trajectories may be a continuum, and therefore innite,
but it can be reasonably argued that a nite subset of these is entirely representative so far
1
Strong AI asserts that algorithms underlie consciousness. Here a less specic hypothesis is adequate {
that consciousness arises from certain patterns formed in the brain's activity.
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as cognitive function is concerned. Furthermore, one can easily argue that this subset must
be vast compared to any plausible estimate of the number of distinguishable thoughts and
experiences contained in a human lifespan. But if the relationship between state trajectories
and the associated mental experiences is xed by nature, then this niteness applies to the
thinkable, and not merely to the thought. That is, if at least one brain state trajectory has
to be allocated to every possible thought or experience, regardless of who, if anyone, ever
actually has that thought or experience, then everyone shares just one nite repertoire of
possible thoughts and experiences with which to decorate their life.
A niteness constraint on the thinkable is somewhat disturbing. It is possible to invent
schemata based on power sets of power sets, etc., which contain arbitrarily vast numbers of
elements, numbers like 2
2
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2
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. Of course no one has time to think about every element of
such a schema individually, but niteness of the thinkable implies that it is impossible to
think of some elements of the schema at all. This is so because given the (nite) number
of possible thoughts, it is an easy matter to invent a schema which contains more elements
than that. Thus, there is an element which is impossible to think of, even if one is free to
direct full attention to it, and every possible eort is made to point it out. Put another way,
there are pairs of elements which cannot be consciously distinguished, no matter how much
eort is put into recognising the distinction.
Perhaps this conclusion is acceptable. Perhaps the thinkable is a nite set, and psychology
experiments can provide estimates of its size by measuring the human ability to distinguish
elements of large schemata. The estimates of the size of the cognitive state space might
even be combined with neurophysiological data to estimate the length and time scales of
cognitively signicant patterns of brain activity.
Perhaps this conclusion is not acceptable. One way out is to insist that there is a sense
in which innitesimally distinct brain states have distinct mental signicance, thus allowing
the thinkable to be innite. Or perhaps Strong AI is wrong; brain states are not the sole
determiners of mental states.
2 The argument in detail
In this section, the argument for niteness of the thinkable is expressed more formally,
and rough estimates are given for the relationship between the scale of cognitively relevant
components of brain-state patterns and the size of the thinkable.
2
2.1 Notation and Terminology
The notation and vocabulary used in [1] is convenient for the present purposes. That paper
formalises the representation of arbitrary concepts by states of neural network models, and
the same formalism serves to represent the support of mental states by brain states.
Let us assume that a brain and its functioning can be fully described by a time-dependent
array of numbers y(t). This is dicult to dispute without aront to some of the soundest
theories known, which hold that any physical system can be fully described by its quantum
state. This is just a complex vector, usually of innite dimension. But if the `mind-magic'
arises from the computational aspects of the brain embodied in the ring patterns of the
neurons, then appeal to the most fundamental physical variables is an unwarranted distrac-
tion. A derived set of variables minimally describing the ring pattern at any time would
serve better for y(t). In any case, let us call a segment of a state trajectory over a nite
time T , fy( )g
=t
=t T
, a state excursion or simply an excursion. Let us call any mental phe-
nomenon arising from an excursion an experience, and say that the excursion represents the
experience.
Of course, unlike computers, brains are not produced on a tightly-controlled assembly line,
so the hardware diers somewhat from one brain to the next. This provides an argument
against using just one vector space to represent all brain states. So to proceed it is necessary
to assume that a vector space big enough to represent an arbitrary brain is not much larger
than a space big enough to represent just one; ie., that there is much commonality between
brains in their cognitively-signicant structure, so comparatively few variables are needed
to express the dierences. In the extreme, this could be defeated by insisting that variables
representing the position of each brain component in space are cognitively important, so that
structurally identical brains in dierent locations could have dierent cognitive possibilities.
This is a somewhat odd use of the term `represent'. It would be quite normal to say that some
of the patterns of electrical activity in the components of a conventional computer `represent'
certain concepts which a programmer has arbitrarily specied. The Strong AI hypothesis
(as taken here) asserts that the `representation' of an experience by an excursion is not an
arbitrary relationship, but entails something along the lines of cause and eect. Therefore
it might sound better to speak of experiences `caused by' or `supported by' excursions of
brain states, and concepts `represented by' excursions of computer states. But this would
emphasise the distinction which Strong AI seeks to blur. The objective of Strong AI is to
put these types of statements on a more equal footing, so a uniform vocabulary and notation
seems worth the oddities it may bring with it.
For any experienceA let there be a like-named Boolean-valued test map which can be applied
3
to any excursion  with the signicance:
A() = 1 means ` represents A' (1)
A() = 0 means nothing.
Assigning a null interpretation to the 0 case makes it possible to have test maps which avoid
borderline cases. The price for this convenience is that a separate test map A must be
introduced to positively assert non-representation of A; one cannot automatically assume
that A() = 1   A(). The set of excursions which represent experience A includes (but
might not equal) A
 1
(1), and the set of experiences represented by  includes (but might
not equal) fAjA() = 1g.
If it is desired to support the notion that an experience may be represented more strongly by
some excursions than others, then a dierent test map can be introduced for every strength
or quality of representation envisaged.
2.2 Size of excursion set
Although the number of neurons and synapses are nite in number, the representationally
relevant variables might still include continuous ones such as ring strengths and the relative
spatial positions of the various brain components. It seems a rather desperate, however, to
load each of the innite bit strings aorded by continuous variables with distinct represen-
tational signicance. It would be remarkable if arbitrarily small changes of such variables
should result in perceptible changes in the mind, not least because the mind's robustness
would be dicult to explain. Therefore let us make a set of assumptions which eectively
forces these variables to take values from a nite set.
An obvious way to proceed is by cutting up a nite-volume state space into cells based on
nite values 
state
and 
time
for cognitively meaningless variations in state variables and time.
Let the state space have nite dimension N , and let the components of the state vector be
real numbers scaled to lie between 0 and 1, 0  y
i
 1. Similarly, let the unit of time be
the longest time that needs to be used to represent a distinct thought. Then the number of
distinct cognitively meaningful states is something like

1

state

N
and the number of excursions
is

1

state

NT
.
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2.3 Remarks on the form of the separation assumptions
It is necessary to be somewhat careful with the phraseology of the assumption which justies
introducing the scales 
state
and 
time
, in order to disallow a change of cognitive state as a
brain state is perturbed innitesimally at a cell boundary. This section gives one way of
going about it.
Let us say for excursion , attention is focused on experience A more than experience B if
A() = 1 and B() = 1. It is possible to focus attention on A more than B if
A
 1
(1)
\
B
 1
(1) 6= ;: (2)
This denotes a set of excursions which represent A and not B.
Let 
A
= fy
A
( )g
=t
=t T
be an excursion which represents attention focused on A more than
on B: 
A
2 A
 1
(1)
T
B
 1
(1). Select 
B
conversely: 
B
2 B
 1
(1)
T
A
 1
(1). Let us assume
that any such 
A
and 
B
are not related by any nite state-time transformation limited
by state warp constant 
state
and time warp constant 
time
. By this it is meant that for any
function ( ) with range [ 1; 1],
jy
Ai
( )  y
Bi
(   ( )
time
)j > 
state
(3)
for each component i of y
A
and every time  2 [t  T; t].
This has the desired eect of keeping representations of distinct experiences nitely separated
without setting up precisely located cell boundaries.
It might be tempting to try to achieve this by making the simpler assumption that for any

B
within a small state warp and time warp of 
A
, that A(
B
) = 1; ie., if 
A
represents A
then any nearby excursion also represents A. But this would be disastrous, because it would
be possible to conclude that every excursion represents every experience, by considering a
succession of small transformations along a continuous path between a pair of excursions
representing an arbitrary pair of experiences.
3 Numerical Estimates
Let us estimate the number of excursions which can represent distinct mental experiences.
The dimension of y can be estimated as N = N
cells
N
cellparts
, where N
cells
is the number of
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neurons in the brain and N
cellparts
is a typical number of representationally-signicant compo-
nents of each neuron. The latter might be the number of synapses per neuron (say 10
4
) or the
number of nite-elements needed in a detailed electrical model of the neuron (say 10
9
). Or
it might be as small as 1, if it is only whether the neuron is ring that matters. The number
of neurons may be something like 10
12
, but perhaps only 10
9
of them are directly involved
in representing experiences. Let N
levels
be the number of representationally-signicant levels
of electrical activity which can occur in each cell component, perhaps 100; perhaps 2.
Let us regard any experience to be conned to a psychological moment of time. Even
if the experience involves distant memories, it is the representation of the recollection of
those memories at the particular moment that counts, not the representation of the original
experience being recalled. A psychological moment of time may be spread over as much as
a second, and the fastest events likely to have representational signicance might consume 1
millisecond. So the number of time steps T in an excursion which represents an experience
is at most 10
3
, and at least 1.
The number of representationally-signicant excursions is therefore
N
excur
= N
N
cells
N
cellparts
T
levels
(4)
which might be as much as 100
10
12+9+3
 10
10
24
or as little as 2
10
9+0+0
 10
10
9
.
The maximum might be increased still further by attaching representational signicance
to congurational degrees of freedom in the brain, in addition to the degrees of freedom
concerning activation. For example, there are roughly 2
N
2
cells
= 2
10
24
ways for the neurons
to be interconnected (neglecting any shortage of synapses for the purpose). But in any
case there does not appear to be any way to compete with the arbitrary power sets whose
elements might be thought to populate the thinkable.
4 Proposed Psychology Experiments
Let us examine more closely a schema which may include more elements than there are
possible thoughts. Perhaps the most straightforward is the natural number system, the set
of numbers between 1 and N
excur
itself. These are at least billion-digit numbers, according
to the above reasoning. So it would be interesting to know whether humans can distinguish
any randomly selected string of a billion digits from any other.
One possible way to organise such an experiment would use 2-dimensional arrays of pixels,
or a 3-dimensional array employing a colour dimension. Current commercial systems provide
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on the order of 10001000 pixels with on the order of 1000 colours, just enough for a billion-
digit experiment. Subjects would be shown a randomly generated pattern, and allowed to
study it for as long as desired. They would then be shown, with 50% probability, either the
same image again, or another which diers by 1 bit, and asked whether the new image were
any dierent.
Strong AI looks relatively safe from attack by this sort of experiment, because it seems
unlikely that humans will perform well in the billion-pixel case, and it would take strong
performance on an awesome 10
24
pixels to put the hypothesis into serious danger of disproof.
Furthermore, this type of experiment only provides lower bounds on the size of the brain-
state space for the part of the brain concerned with representing visual images, which in
turn is only a lower bound on the number of thoughts or experiences the mind can have.
Experiments to provide a measure of the entire variety of mental experience remain to be
devised.
Regardless of any implications for Strong AI, this type of experiment may provide evidence
that representation of mental experiences from restricted domains is accomplished with neu-
ral machinery operating on particular spatial or temporal scales. If neurophysiological evi-
dence suggests that a specic area of the brain is responsible for representing the experiences
in question, then (4) can be applied to that area.
5 Conclusions
In a computer, the contents of memory have no a priori representational signicance. A
programmer has the freedom to impose an arbitrary interpretation on them. This freedom
of interpretation allows a computer to represent many more ideas than the size of the state
space of its memory. There is no analogous freedom in the relationship between mind and
brain, if, as philosophies such as Strong AI suggest, mental experiences are underpinned
by spacio-temporal patterns of neural activity in a specic, presently unknown, way. The
size of the brain's state space places an upper bound on the number of possible mental
experiences. This makes it interesting to examine large schemata of possible (or seemingly
possible) experiences, such as those based on number systems or progressions of power sets,
in search of a set of thinkable thoughts larger than the the set of brain states. Success in
such an endevour would provide serious evidence against Strong AI.
Such an endeavour appears to be dicult, however. Psychology experiments seeking such
a result may be interesting and valuable, but it seems unlikely that human performance in
these experiments would be strong enough to threaten Strong AI.
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